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Abstract
In real-life, individuals are often assigned to binary treatments based on es-
tablished covariate-based protocols. Direct or implicit taste-based discrimination
would make such protocols economically ineﬃcient in that the expected gain from
treatment would be smaller for a subset of the currently treated than the currently
untreated. We present a framework for detecting such ineﬃciency using a partial
identiﬁcation approach which continues to work when the decision-maker observes
more covariates than us. We also propose a novel way of inferring the relevant
counterfactual distributions by combining observational datasets with experimen-
tal estimates. The method can be extended to (partially) infer risk-preferences of
the decision-maker, under which observed allocations are eﬃcient. The most risk
neutral solution may be obtained via maximizing entropy. We outline the theory of
inference and study the eﬃcacy of our methodology using a simulation exercise. Our
methods apply when individuals cannot alter their potential treatment outcomes in
response to the decision-maker’s actions unlike the case of law enforcement (c.f.,
Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001)).
1 Introduction
In many real-life situations, external decision-makers assign individuals to treatments.
Examples include banks approving mortgage and business loans, doctors referring patients
1to surgery and ﬁrms hiring interns. However, existing protocols for deciding treatment
status may be economically ineﬃcient in that the expected gain from treating a subgroup
of those currently being treated is smaller than that from treating a subset of the untreated
individuals, the expectation being taken with respect to the true underlying distribution
of the random variables concerned. This situation implies that the treatment, to be
thought of as a scarce resource, is being assigned among individuals in a way that does not
maximize its overall productivity. A leading cause of such ineﬃciency is prejudice against
speciﬁc demographic groups— either direct or implicit— but ineﬃciency can also arise from
the failure to condition on relevant covariates or systematic biases in the decision-maker’s
(DM, henceforth) subjective expectation. When such misallocation occurs, we say that
there is non-statistical discrimination against the untreated subgroup with the higher
potential gain. We present a framework for detecting and analyzing such misallocation
using a partial identiﬁcation approach. Unless one has access to exactly the same variables
as the DM, one can at best detect misallocation but cannot in general infer if misallocation
has occurred because of prejudice or some other, perhaps more innocuous, reason.1
The present paper focuses on the case where the treatment in question is binary and
the outcome of interest either binary or continuous. We assume that an experienced DM
observes for each individual a set of covariates and assigns him/her to treatment based
on the expected gains from treatment, conditional on these covariate values. In this set-
up, a necessary condition for the DM’s assignment to be productively eﬃcient is that in
every observable covariate group, the expected net beneﬁt of treatment (relative to cost)
to the marginal treatment recipient, i.e., the "last person" to have received treatment is
equal to or greater than2 a common threshold which, in turn, is greater than or equal
to the expected net beneﬁto ft h e" ﬁrst person" to have been denied treatment. Here,
last and ﬁrst refer to the types of individuals with the smallest and the largest expected
beneﬁt from treatment, respectively, where types are deﬁned in terms of the characteristics
observed by the DM. Misallocation occurs when the beneﬁt to the marginal recipient
diﬀers signiﬁcantly across covariates and it can arise if, for instance, diﬀerent thresholds
are used for diﬀerent covariate groups, which would happen if the DM was prejudiced
against certain groups. The DM’s assignment results in an observational dataset, where
for each individual, we observe her treatment status, her outcome conditional on her
1Thus, here we are making a conscious distinction between "non-statistical discrimination" and
"prejudice"— a point on which we elaborate below.
2Strict inequality can occur at the margin if, for instance, all covariates are discrete,
2treatment status and a set of covariate values. The problem is to detect misallocation of
treatment from this dataset.
Detecting ineﬃcient treatment allocation from such an observational dataset alone is
complicated by two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the DM can base treatment assignment on
characteristics that are not observed by us. This makes it is hard, if not impossible, to
know who are the "marginal" treatment recipient and non-recipients— a problem already
recognized in the literature (c.f., Heckman (1998), Persico (2009)) and labeled "inframar-
ginality". Further, beneﬁts are also hard to measure with a single observational dataset
because, as is well known, counterfactual means are not observed.
In this paper, we discuss a new approach to detecting misallocation in such situations.
The key idea is to use the notion of partial identiﬁcation, motivated by the implication of
eﬃcient allocation that expected net beneﬁts in every subset of the treated group must
weakly exceed expected net beneﬁts in every subset of the untreated group— a (condi-
tional) moment inequality condition. These moment inequalities for subsets deﬁned by
covariates that the DM observes have testable implications for the (cruder) subsets based
on the covariates that we observe. These implications can therefore be tested. Secondly,
we propose a novel way to identify the necessary counterfactual means by combining an
observational dataset with experimental estimates on subjects drawn from the same pop-
ulation. The latter supplements existing methods of identifying counterfactuals using,
say, instrumental variables.
The bulk of our analysis rests upon three assumptions. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h eD M
is experienced in the sense that he can form correct expectations. The second is that
the DM observes and can condition treatment allocation on all the characteristics (and
p o s s i b l ym o r et h a n )t h o s et h a tw eo b s e r v e .T h i r d ,w eo b s e r v et h es a m eoutcomes whose
expectations, taken by the DM, determine treatment assignment in the observational
dataset.
The third assumption simply clariﬁes that the deﬁnition of productivity (with respect
to which ineﬃciency is deﬁned) must be unanimously agreed upon and this common
measure of productivity should be observable and veriﬁable. The second assumption seems
quite natural; but we discuss below in section 4 when it might fail and the implications
thereof. The ﬁrst assumption—a "rational expectations" idea— is part of our deﬁnition
of eﬃciency, i.e., we are testing the joint hypothesis that the DM can calculate correct
expectations and is allocating treatment eﬃciently, based on those calculations. In other
3words, we cannot distinguish between the cases where the DM’s subjective expectations
deviate from the true expectations in a speciﬁc, systematic way and lead to the ineﬃciency
observed and the case where the DM can form correct expectations but ends up with an
ineﬃcient allocation due to, say, prejudice against speciﬁc demographic groups. Thus,
rational expectations can be assumed here without loss of generality since our ultimate
aim is to detect misallocation—whatever its cause.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the contribution of
the present paper in relation to the existing literature in economics and econometrics.
Section 3 presents the partial identiﬁcation methodology, discusses how counterfactuals
may be identiﬁed via data combination and demonstrates how the analysis is robust to
failure of a key identical distribution assumption which underlies the data combination
method. Section 4 discusses some, albeit subtle, diﬃculties which prevent one from pin-
pointing the cause of misallocation even when it has been detected. Section 5 discusses
the complementary problem of inferring a DM’s underlying risk-preferences which would
justify the current allocations as eﬃcient. Section 6 brieﬂy outlines the theory of inference.
Section 7 presents a simulation study and section 8 concludes.
We would like to end this section by re-emphasizing that our methodology can detect
ineﬃciency of treatment assignment and identify the demographic groups that are suf-
fering as a result of it but it cannot distinguish between the various causes which might
lead a DM to such an allocation. The existing literature in economics sometimes uses the
term "statistical discrimination" to mean an eﬃcient allocation that leads to disparities
in treatment rates but, in our reading, it is unclear about whether "non-statistical" dis-
crimination can arise only from prejudice. The present paper analyzes this latter point
in greater details than previously attempted and presents some examples to illustrate the
subtleties involved in the analysis.
2 Literature and contributions
It is useful at this stage to contrast our work with some existing empirical approaches
within economics to detect "discrimination" in the assignment of a binary treatment. Re-
call the key identiﬁcation problem, viz., that it is impossible to tell if the group receiving
less treatment does so because it is less endowed with those determinants of productiv-
ity which we do not observe but the DM does or because the DM is prejudiced against
4that group. To get around the problem of confounding unobservables, Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2004) randomly assigned black and white names to fake resumes and found that
resumes with black names are less favorably regarded by potential employers. Similarly,
Goldin and Rouse compared blind auditions for musicians with non-blind ones and found
that signiﬁcantly more women were selected in blind auditions. If we assume that race
(gender) has no additional information about the relevant productivity over and above the
resume (the audition performance), then the two cited studies can be regarded as having
detected prejudice. It is, however, conceivable that race or gender do play an important
role in general in the eventual outcomes that DMs care about. Thus, without actually
observing the ﬁnal outcomes of interest, one cannot distinguish between statistical and
non-statistical sources of the disparities observed.
In a series of studies, Knowles, Persico, Todd (2001) and several other authors have
examined the problem of detecting taste-based prejudice separately from statistical dis-
crimination in the context of vehicle search by the police, using data on ﬁnal outcomes
(hit rates). The key insight is that in law-enforcement contexts, potential treatment re-
cipients can alter their behavior— and thus their potential outcome upon being treated—
in response to the treator’s behavior. This argument enables them to solve the prob-
lem of "inframarginality" and test for the economic eﬃciency of the existing allocation.
While their approach applies to many situations of interest, especially ones involving law
enforcement, it is not applicable to all situations of treatment assignment where misal-
location is a concern. For example, it is very diﬃcult— if not impossible— for patients to
alter their potential health outcomes with and without surgery in response to the nature
of treatment protocols used by doctors.
In independent and ongoing work, Chandra and Staiger (2010) consider the problem
of identifying provider prejudice in intensive treatments for heart- attacks. They use an
instrumental variable approach to identify counterfactuals and attempt to test equality
of treatment thresholds under a strong high-level assumption on the distribution of unob-
servables for the two groups being compared (e.g., males and females). Essentially, their
method works if either the c.d.f. of beneﬁt distribution of one group is simply that of the
other group, translated by a ﬁxed amount, or if the unobservable distribution is identical
for the two groups, conditional on the observables—leading to a "single index" structure
(c.f., Powell (1994)). But the latter essentially assumes away the inframarginality problem
which is the central source of diﬃculty in detecting ineﬃciency.
5On the econometric side, our paper links the discrimination literature in economics
with the partial identiﬁcation approach, pioneered by Manski, that has been receiving
a lot of recent attention. Our paper attempts to show how one can use the partial
identiﬁcation idea to make progress in solving an important and diﬃcult detection problem
long recognized in the economics literature. In particular, we analyze the problem of
inferring the set of (sub)-utility functions of the DM which would rationalize an observed
allocation pattern. We also show that a maximum entropy solution in this case gives
us that admissible utility which is closest to risk neutrality and this solution is easy to
compute and report rather than the entire identiﬁed set. This focus on ﬁnding speciﬁc
parameter values which have intuitive or economic interpretation among all the ones
in an identiﬁed set appears to be novel. It also raises interesting inferential problems
pertaining to optimization with stochastic constraints which, to our knowledge, have not
been explored before.
A series of papers in the forecasting literature propose testing rationality of forecasts
made by central agencies (c.f. Elliott, Komunjer and Timmerman (2005), Patton and
Timmerman (2007) etc.). The idea is to (point) estimate parameters of the loss-function
which rationalize the observed forecasts. The set-up in that literature assumes that the
action (i.e., the forecast) has no eﬀect on the distribution of the future outcome. In
contrast, the key issue in our set-up is that the action (treatment status) fundamentally
aﬀects the distribution of the outcome and so the methodology of forecast rationality tests
cannot be used in our problem.
Lastly, our identiﬁcation approach uses counterfactual means and we propose a novel
way of obtaining them by combining the observational dataset with estimates from an
experimental study where individuals were randomized into and out of treatment.3 This
method works best when the experimental group is drawn from the same population as
the observational one. However, the method works even in the case where the individuals
willing to be randomized are worse (i.e., have worse outcomes with and without the
treatment) along unobserved dimensions, which is sometimes the case in medical trials.
The cost of this complication is that it will be harder for us to detect misallocation relative
to the case where the two distributions are identical.
3In the context of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for example, our proposed method would be
to randomly oﬀer jobs to individuals and record individual productivity and then combine this with a
dataset where employers were allowed to choose among applicants and the resulting productivities were
recorded.
63 Methodology
Denote outcome with and without treatment by 0 and 1, respectively and let ∆ =
1 −0. Analogously, deﬁne 1 and 0 as the potential costs corresponding to treatment
and no treatment, respectively. Let  =( ) denote the covariates observed by the
DM, where the component  is not observed by us. Let X  denote the support of  for
the subpopulation who would be assigned  = ,  =0 1 by the DM and  denote
expectations taken w.r.t. the DM’s subjective probability distributions, .
Consider the DM’s optimization problem
max

½Z
1{ ∈ }1

1(1)+
Z
1{ ∈ 
}0

0(0)
¾
s.t. Z
1{ ∈ }1

1 (1)+
Z
1{ ∈ 
}0

0 (0) ≤ .
The solution, as shown in the appendix, is of the form

∗ = { :  ()  },w i t h
 () ≡
 (∆| = )
 (∆ | = )
,
 =
Z
∈
1( ()  )

 ().( 1 )
Although this solution is intuitive, a formal proof is needed because other criteria like
[∆
∆ | = ]  ,o r[1
1 − 0
0| = ]  , etc., which seem intuitively just as
sensible, do not solve the problem!
Since the DM’s subjective expectations are assumed to be consistent with true distri-
b u t i o n si nt h ep o p u l a t i o n ,w em u s th a v et h a tw . p . 1 ,
(∆ | =1 ) ≥  (∆| =1 ),
(∆ | =0 ) ≤  (∆| =0 ).( 2 )
Given the allocation procedure leading to (2), as  =( ) varies,  remains ﬁxed but
treatment rates Pr( =1 |) will in general vary, giving rise to eﬃcient or statistical—
as opposed to ineﬃcient or taste-based— discrimination. In contrast, taste-based discrim-
ination will be said to occur if  varies by . Another equivalent interpretation is that
a - t y p ei n d i v i d u a l sw i l lb et r e a t e di f(∆ | = ) −  (∆| = ) exceeds zero.
Thus  m a yb ei n t e r p r e t e da st h ew e i g h tb e i n gp u to nt h eb e n e ﬁto fa-type person while
7the same threshold of zero is being applied to all .I f varies by , then the beneﬁts
of diﬀerent covariate groups are being weighed diﬀerently—which would be regarded as
discriminatory.
S i n c ew ed on o to b s e r v e, the inequalities in (2) are not of immediate use to us.
However, an implication of (2) is potentially useful for detecting ineﬃciency. Indeed, (2)
implies that

Z
 (∆ | =1 )|=1 (| =1 )
≥
Z
 (∆| =1 )|=1 (| =1 ),
i.e.
 [∆| =1  1 = ]
 [∆ | =1  1 = ]
≤ ,f o ra l l ∈ X
1,( 3 )
and similarly
 [∆| =0  1 = ]
 [∆ | =0  1 = ]
 , for all  ∈ X
0.( 4 )
In words, if the DM is acting rationally, then the ratio of average gain from treatment
and average increase in cost for every subgroup (that the DM can observe) among the
treatment recipients must exceed the treatment threshold. Since this would have to hold
for every subgroup among the treated, it must also hold for groups (observed by us) con-
structed by aggregating these subgroups and averaging the gain across those subgroups.
This leads to (3) and analogously for (4). This reasoning lets us overcome the problem
posed by the DM observing more covariates than us and preserves the inequality needed
for inference.
It follows now that if for some  6= ,w eh a v et h a t
 [∆| =0  1 = ]
 [∆ | =0  1 = ]

 [∆| =1  1 = ]
 [∆ | =1  1 = ]
,
then we conclude that there is misallocation and too few people of type  are being teated.
One example of 1 in the case of medical treatment is health insurance status. To
judge whether providers are discriminating against the uninsured, we need to test the
above inequality with 1 =  denoting the uninsured and 1 =  denoting the insured.
In this case, 1 and 0 can denote either total cost of the two treatments or the out-
of-pocket cost, borne by the patient. For a loan application example, where  =1
is approving the loan, 1 would denote the return on that loan if approved, 0 ≡ 0,
80 ≡ 0,a n d1 is the amount of the loan plus administrative costs involved in managing
the money-lending procedure. In this latter case, the constraint would be imposed by a
regulatory ceiling on how much in aggregate the bank can lend.
To be able to use the above inequalities to learn about , we need to identify the coun-
terfactual mean outcomes  (0| =1 )and  (1| =0 )and the counterfactual
mean costs  (0| =1 )and  (1| =0 ) . The econometric literature on treat-
ment eﬀect estimation has proposed a variety of ways to point-identify or provide bounds
on these counterfactual means. We propose a new and simple way to point identify these
means, viz., we supplement the observational dataset with estimates from an experiment,
where individuals are randomized in and out of treatment. If the observational and the
experimental samples are drawn from the same population, then combining them will
yield the necessary counterfactual distributions. To see this, notice that for any  ∈ X 1,
 (0  | = )
| {z }
known from expt
= 
 (0  | = )
= 
 (0  | =1 = ) × 
 ( =1 | = )
| {z }
known from obs
+
 (0  | =0 = )
| {z }
known from obs
× 
 ( =0 | = )
| {z }
known from obs
.( 5 )
Similarly for any  ∈ X 0,
Pr(1  |)
| {z }
known from expt
=P r ( 1  | =0 ) × Pr( =0 |)
| {z }
known from obs
+Pr(1  | =1 )
| {z }
known from obs
× Pr( =1 |)
| {z }
from obs
.( 6 )
Thus the two equalities above yield the counterfactual distributions  (0  | =1 )
on X 1 and  (1  | =0 ) on X 0. When we know the means but not the distribution
of 1 and 0 from the experiment, we have to replace the c.d.f.’s in the previous displays
by the corresponding means, giving us, for instance, for any  ∈ X 0,
 (1|)
| {z }
known from expt
=  (1| =0 ) × Pr( =0 |)
| {z }
known from obs
+ (1| =1 )
| {z }
known from obs
× Pr( =1 |)
| {z }
from obs
.
9Combining (3), (4), (5) and (6) yield the following bounds on :
 =i n f
∈X0
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
 (1| =  =0 )
| {z }
from (5)
−  (0| =  =0 )
| {z }
from obs data
 (1| =  =0 )
| {z }
from (5)
−  (0| =  =0 )
| {z }
from obs data
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
,
 =s u p
∈X1
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
 (1| =  =1 )
| {z }
from obs data
−  (0| =  =1 )
| {z }
from (6)
 (1| =  =1 )
| {z }
from obs data
−  (0| =  =1 )
| {z }
from (6)
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.( 7 )
The bounds derived above essentially replace a minimum over ﬁner subgroups (ob-
served by the DM) by the minimum over groups (observed by us) of the subgroup aver-
ages. So one would expect the bounds to be wider when (i) the unobserved covariates
have larger support making the average across subgroups further from the minimum or
maximum across subgroups, and (ii) the observed covariates are correlated with the unob-
served ones to a lesser extent. The bounds would collapse to a singleton if we observe the
same covariates as the DM. In the loan example, if all that the DM sees is the application
form which is also made available to the econometrician, then  is null and  = ,
leading to point identiﬁcation of .
Alternative designs and data issues: There are two diﬀerent ways to perform the
data combination exercise. In the ﬁrst, the observational micro-data are combined with
estimates obtained from an experimental study, conducted by other researchers. In prac-
tical terms, due to data protection conventions, it is much easier to access experimental
estimates than it is to access the raw micro-data from trials which were used to calculate
those estimates. However, one has to make sure that the observational group and the
experimental group were drawn from the same population and the same covariates were
recorded in both cases.
The better but practically harder option is to actually run an experiment, which can
also be done in two ways. In the ﬁrst, a sample of individuals is randomly divided into
an experimental arm and a non-experimental one. The experimental arm individuals are
randomly assigned to treatment and the observational arm ones are handed over to a DM
who uses his/her discretion. The second way is as follows. First, present all the individ-
uals to the DM and record his recommendations for treatment. This recommendation is
recorded as  =1when recommended to have treatment and as  =0 , otherwise. Then
we randomize actual approval across all applications (ignoring the DM’s recommenda-
10tion) and observe the outcomes for each individual. The counterfactual  (0| =1 )
can then be obtained from the outcomes of those who are approved by the DM but were
randomized out of treatment. Conversely for  (1| =0 ).
The experimental approach requires signiﬁcantly more work to implement but gives
us the ideal set-up where the experimental and observational groups are ex-ante identi-
cal and the same variables can be recorded for both groups. The ﬁrst method, where
experimental results from existing studies are used instead of actually running an exper-
iment, is applicable in many more situations. However, one is somewhat constrained by
the outcomes and covariates that the original researchers had chosen. For the exercise of
inferring risk preferences (see section 5, below) in the case of non-binary outcomes, one
would need the full experimental approach because trial studies rarely report marginal
distributions of 0 and 1 (rather than means and medians) which are needed to conduct
this exercise.
3.1 Misallocation
The bounds analysis presented above can be used to test whether there is misallocation
of treatment both within and between demographic groups. To ﬁxi d e a s ,s u p p o s e =
(1) and we are interested in testing if there is treatment misallocation within
males and within females and then we want to test if treatment misallocation between
males and females occurs in a way that hurts, say, females.
To do these tests, perform the above analysis separately for females and males and
get the bounds
Γ =
Ã
sup∈(1|=1=1)
[∆|1==1,=1]
[∆ |1==1,=1]
inf∈(1|=1=0)
[∆|1==1,=0]
[∆ |1==1,=0]
!
and analogously Γ.N o w ,i fΓ (or Γ)i se m p t y ,t h e nw ec o n c l u d et h a tt h e r ei s
misallocation within females (males). Further, if Γ ∩ Γ is empty, then it implies
that diﬀerent thresholds were used for females and males and thus there is misallocation
between males and females.
Intuition: Why empty sets imply misallocation can be best understood by ignoring
1 for the time being. Notice that Γ∩ Γ =  means that either
[∆ |=0 , =1 ]
[∆|=0 , =1 ]

[∆ |=1 , =0 ]
[∆|=1 , =0 ]
(8)
11or
[∆ |=1 , =1 ]
[∆|=1 , =1 ]

[∆ |=0 , =0 ]
[∆|=0 , =0 ]
.( 9 )
The ﬁrst inequality (8) means that the expected (rise in) beneﬁt relative to (rise in) cost
of treatment among treated males is less than that among untreated females— i.e., females
are being under-treated. Equivalently, females face a smaller . Similarly, (9) means that
males are being under-treated.
Notice that the inequalities (??) or (8) can be interpreted and used directly with-
out reference to a speciﬁc model of optimization or treatment allocation such as (1) or
(??). However, the link with (1) and (??) gives our analysis a ﬁrm grounding in classical
economic theory of choice under uncertainty.
3.2 Nonidentical distributions
We now consider the possibility that the observational sample and the experimental sam-
ple were drawn from diﬀerent subsets of the population. For example, sometimes it is the
case in medical trials that inherently sicker patients agree to be randomized. In this case,
it is reasonable to expect that exp (0|) ≤  (0|) and exp (1|) ≤  (1|).
Similarly, exp(0|)   (0|) and exp (1|)   (1|). Using the same steps
as those leading to (5), one gets that

 (0| =1 )=
 (0|) −  ( =0 |) ×  (0| =0 )
 ( =1 |)
≥
exp (0|) −  ( =0 |) ×  (0| =0 )
 ( =1 |)
≡ ¯  (0| =1 ),
and similarly,

 (1| =0 )=
 (1|) −  ( =0 |) ×  (1| =0 )
 ( =1 |)
≥
exp (1|) −  ( =0 |) ×  (1| =0 )
 ( =1 |)
≡ ¯  (1| =0 ).
The quantities ¯  (1| =0 ) and ¯  (0| =1 ) are clearly identiﬁed. An analogous
set of inequalities hold with  replaced by  and the inequality sign reversed (since the
12experimental group, being sicker will be more expensive to treat). These bounds can be
used to detect misallocation. For instance, if it is the case that
 (1| =1 ) − ¯  (0| =1 )
 (1| =1 ) − ¯  (0| =1 )
≤
¯  (1| =0 ) −  (0| =0 )
¯  (1| =0 ) −  (0| =0 )
,( 1 0 )
then it follows that
1


 (∆ | =1 )
 (∆| =1 )
≤
 (1| =1 ) − ¯  (0| =1 )
 (1| =1 ) − ¯  (0| =1 )
≤
¯  (1| =0 ) −  (0| =0 )
¯  (1| =0 ) −  (0| =0 )
≤
 (∆ | =0 )
 (∆| =0 )
≤
1

.
Thus,  is smaller, meaning that the outcomes of females are being weighed less
relative to males. However, since (10) implies (8), it will be harder to detect misallocation
here compared to when the experimental and observational data came from identical
populations.
4 Alternative mechanisms leading to misallocation
We now discuss three alternative allocation mechanisms which can potentially lead to
empty identiﬁed sets and thus suggest misallocation. We deﬁne and make the distinc-
tion between wilful or prejudicial discrimination, inadvertent discrimination and implicit
discrimination— all of which will lead to misallocation that we can potentially detect with
our bounds-based analysis. Instead of presenting general models, we describe speciﬁc
scenarios to outline the subtleties which make it hard to move from detection of misallo-
cation to discerning its source. For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that ∆ is a
constant  (i.e., does not vary with any component of ), so that the optimal decision
criterion will be
 =1⇐⇒  (∆ |)  ,
where  = .
134.1 Inadvertent Discrimination
Suppose individuals are characterized by race (black/white) and gender (male/female).
Suppose it is the case that
(∆ |)  (∆ |)  (∆ |)

  (∆ |).( 1 1 )
Suppose that the fraction of whites among women is high enough that
(∆ |)  (∆ |).( 1 2 )
That is, black females beneﬁt a lot from treatment while while females beneﬁtt h el e a s t .
If white females are a much larger group than black females, then on average, females
beneﬁt less from treatment and hence (12) holds.
Now suppose the DM ignores race and allocates treatment, based only on gender.
Then  =1iﬀ t h ei n d i v i d u a li sm a l ea n ds oi tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
(∆ | =0 )
= (∆ |)
 (∆ |),b y( 1 1 )
= (∆ | =1 ).
Thus, we would conclude that there is misallocation which works against blacks precisely
because the DM is race-blind in his decision-making.
Notice that this violates a key assumption we started with, viz., that the DM uses all
covariates that we observe plus possibly more. Here we observe race but the DM does not
take into account race in making the allocation. This works against black females because
they are treated the same as white females because of their gender and the inability or
unwillingness of the DM to condition on race. The scenario described above is quite stark
in that we are detecting misallocation by race precisely because the DM is not taking race
into account in making the allocation. It would thus be dramatically wrong to conclude
from (??)t h a tt h e r ei sprejudice against blacks. Notice that this "mistake" is very diﬀerent
from and more subtle than the mistake of interpreting statistical discrimination as taste-
based discrimination.
144.2 Wilful Discrimination
T h i si st h es i m p l e s tc a s ew h e r ed i ﬀerent thresholds are being used for the diﬀerent de-
mographic groups. In our gender example above, females are discriminated against if
  . Notice that such wilful discrimination has no implications for the rate
of treatment in the two groups. That is, it is certainly possible that  = 
and Pr( =1 |=0 )  Pr( =1 =1 ) . Conversely, it is also possible that
   but Pr( =1 |=0 )≤ Pr( =1 =1 ) . Whether the rate of treat-
ment is equal across demographic groups depends on the fraction of individuals within
that group whose expected beneﬁts from treatment are above the threshold for that group.
So an eﬃcient allocation, using a common threshold for all demographic groups, may be
one where a larger fraction of males are treated if a larger fraction of males have expected
beneﬁts from treatment above the common threshold than females.
4.3 Implicit discrimination
Suppose the DM discriminates by race. It is possible that we will conclude there is
misallocation which works against the poor. The following scenario illustrates the point.
Suppose it is the case that
 (∆ |)   (∆ |)
 (∆ |) (∆ |)  .
Suppose the DM observes both race and wealth status and thus assigns the rich blacks
and all whites to treatment. Then we have that
 (∆ | =0 ) =  (∆ |)
 (∆ | =1 ) =  (∆ |) × Pr(|)
+ (∆ |) × Pr(|)
'  (∆ |) if Pr(|) ' 1.
Since it is the case that
 (∆ |) (∆ |),
we will conclude that
 (∆ | =0 )(∆ | =1 ),
15i.e., that there is misallocation which works against the poor. This will happen even if
the DM is not explicitly discriminating against the poor. The root is of course the high
positive correlation between being white and rich. Pope and Sydnor (2008) in somewhat
diﬀerent contexts have discussed such "implicit proﬁling".
In all three cases listed above, we would potentially detect misallocation based on some
covariate(s). However, this misallocation could be a result of prejudicial discrimination
based on that particular covariate, inadvertent discrimination from ignoring that covariate
in the allocation or implicit discrimination on a positively correlated covariate. While the
exact form of discrimination cannot be pinpointed, one can conclude that there has been
misallocation of treatment, leading some demographic groups to receive less and some
others to receive more amounts of treatment than what economic eﬃciency would dictate.
In our terminology, the former group has been subjected to non-statistical discrimination.
5 Broadening the model
We now extend the analysis to include risk averse behavior by the DM and transform the
problem of detecting misallocation for a speciﬁc outcome to the problem of detecting the
extent of risk aversion which justify the observed allocation as an eﬃcient one.
5.1 Risk Aversion: Parametric
In this part of the analysis we ask what risk-averse utility function(s) are consistent with
eﬃcient allocation, given the data. To do this we consider a family of risk averse utility
functions (·),i n d e x e db yaﬁnite dimensional parameter  and the corresponding
allocation rule which is a generalization of (??)
 =1iﬀ
 ((1)|) −  ((0)|)
 (1|) −  (0|)
 .( 1 3 )
Examples of such utility functions are CRRA () ≡  1−
1− for  ∈ (01) and CARA
() ≡−  for  ≥ 0.L e t∆ () ≡ (1) − (0).
When the DM’s subjective expectations are consistent with true distributions in the
p o p u l a t i o n ,w eh a v et h a t
 ((1)| =1 )−  ((0)| =1 )
 (1| =1 )−  (0| =1 )
 , w.p.1.
16As before, we do the analysis separately for males and females to get the bounded sets in
terms of :
[ ()  ()] =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
⎛
⎜ ⎜
⎝
sup∈(1|=1=0)
[∆ ()|1==1,=0]
[∆|1==1,=0]

≤ inf∈(1|=1=1)
[∆ ()|1==1,=1]
[∆|1==1,=1]
⎞
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎭
and similarly, [()  ()].
So the values of  which are consistent with eﬃcient allocation within gender are the
ones for which
 () ≤  () and  () ≤ ().( 1 4 )
Further, the values of  which are consistent with eﬃcient allocation across demographic
groups are the ones for which
max{ () ()} ≤ min{ () ()}.( 1 5 )
If the set of  ≥ 0 for which both (14) and (15) hold turns out to be empty, then no member
of the corresponding family of utility functions will justify the observed allocation as an
eﬃcient one.
5.2 Risk Aversion: nonparametric
Now consider a general diﬀerentiable Bernoulli utility function (·) which will be the
ingredient of a VnM utility deﬁned over lotteries. In order for such a utility function to
rationalize the observed treatment choice, we must have that for all 0
 [(1) − (0)| =1 = ]
 [∆| =1 = ]
≥
 [(1) − (0)| =0 = 0]
 [∆| =0 = 0]
.( 1 6 )
H e r e ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r eb o t h and  are discrete. The continuous case is
treated as a separate subsection. So assume that 1 and 0 are discrete, with union
support equal to {1}.The above condition reduces to: for all 0:
 X
=1
()
½
Pr(1 = | =1 )− Pr(0 = | =1 )
 [1 − 0| =1 = ]
¾
| {z }
=1(),s a y
≥
 X
=1
()
½
Pr(1 = | =0 )− Pr(0 = |0=0 )
 [1 − 0| =0 = ]
¾
| {z }
0(0),s a y
.
17Letting ()= and  (0)=1 ()−0 ( 0), the previous display reduces to
a set of linear restrictions
1 =0 ,  =1(aﬃne normalization),
+1 ≥ ,  =1  − 1 (monotonic),
+1 − 
+1 − 
≥
+2 − +1
+2 − +1
,  =1  − 2 (concave),
 X
=1
 (
0) ≥ 0 for all 
0.( 1 7 )
When  is also discrete, the above inequalities deﬁne a ﬁnite-dimensional polyhedron.
There exist algorithms for ﬁnding extreme points of a polyhedron deﬁned through in-
equality constraints. The identiﬁed set of ’s are the convex hull of those extreme points
and one can base a test of DM rationality on whether the identiﬁed set of ’s is empty.
5.2.1 Equivalent conditions:
At this point, it is meaningful to ask the following question. Suppose we ﬁnd that for
()=, i.e., allocations based on expected gains, the corresponding set of ’s is empty—
suggesting misallocation. Then under what conditions shall we always (never) ﬁnd a
nondecreasing concave utility function under which the observed allocations will be eﬃ-
cient under the utility function? In other words, is every observed allocation justiﬁable
as an eﬃcient one for some choice of (·)? The following proposition provides the answer
i nt h ec a s ew h e r e takes on ﬁnite positive values.
Suppose w.l.o.g.  t a k e sv a l u e si nt h eﬁnite set 0=1 ≤ 2 ≤  ≤  =1 .F o rt w o
subgroups 1 and 2, let
()=
Pr( = | =  = )
 (∆| =  = )
,
for  =1 ,  =0 1,  =0 1 and  =1 2. Suppose that we have detected ineﬃciency
whereby group 2 is being under-treated, viz.,
 (∆ | =1 =1 )
 (∆| =1 =1 )

 (∆ | =0 =2 )
 (1 − 0| =0 =2 )
, i.e.,
 X
=1
 [111 () − 011 () − 102 ()+002 ()]  0.( 1 8 )
18Let
 = 111 () − 011 ()
| {z }
=1
− (102 () − 002 ())
| {z }
=2
,
and observe that by deﬁnition,
P
=1  =0and
P
=1   0. The question is: can we
necessarily ﬁnd (·) nondecreasing and concave, such that
 ((1) − (0)| =1 =1 )
 (∆| =1 =1 )
≥
 ((1) − (0)| =0 =2 )
 (∆| =0 =2 )
,i . e . ,
 X
=1
() ≥ 0.( 1 9 )
The following proposition provides a characterization.
Deﬁne  =
P
=1 ,  =
P−1
=1  (+1 − ),f o r =2 ,....N o t et h a t
 =
−1 X
=1
 (+1 − )=−
 X
=1
  0.
Proposition 1 Suppose {} is such that
P
=1  =0and
P
=1   0. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i)  ≥ 0, for every  =1  − 1.
(ii) there does not exist any nondecreasing and concave (·),s u c ht h a t( 1 9 )h o l d s .
Condition (i) can be checked directly before we try to ﬁnd the set of solutions. Note
that this proposition is of a similar ﬂavour to the equivalence of second order stochastic
dominance and dominance in terms of every concave and monotone sub-utility function,
but applicable to the case where the ’s are more complicated than just probabilities and
the support points are not equally spaced.
Proof. See appendix.
5.2.2 Maximum entropy solution
The methodology outlined above (c.f., (17)) gives a whole set of utility functions which
may be diﬃcult to report because it will generically be an inﬁnite set. We therefore con-
sider a variant of the problem where, instead of trying to ﬁn dt h ee n t i r es e to fa d m i s s i b l e
utilities, we ﬁnd the one among them which is closest to a speciﬁc utility function, such as
19the risk neutral one ()= or a speciﬁc risk-averse one, e.g., ()=
√
. This objective
can be achieved through the use of entropy maximization, which we describe now.
Recall the constraints (17). Deﬁne 1 = 1 =0and  =  − −1 for  =2 .I n
matrix notation,
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
1
2


⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
| {z }

=
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
10 0  0
−110 0
0 −110  0
 
0  0 −11
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
| {z }

⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
1
2


⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
| {z }
,
where  is nonsingular. Also, for ﬁxed , 0,l e t(0) denote the -vector whose th
entry is  (0). Then the constraints (17) can be rewritten as
 ≥ 0,  =1  − 1,
 X
=1
 =1 ,

 − −1
≥
+1
+1 − 
,  =1  − 1

0 £

−1(
0)
¤
≥ 0 for all 
0.( 2 0 )
Given the form of the constraints, one can apply the principle of maximum entropy and
solve
max
(
−
 X
=1
µ

 − −1
¶
ln
µ

 − −1
¶)
,s . t .( 2 0 ) .
If there were no -constraints, then the solution would be  = −−1. This corresponds
to the risk-neutral situation ()=. Therefore maximizing the entropy s.t. the con-
straints corresponds to ﬁnding the most risk-neutral (·) which satisﬁes the constraints.
Standard software can be used to perform these calculations since the problem is strictly
concave. Once the ’s are obtained, one can ﬁnd the corresponding ’s by using  = −1.
To get the utility function closest to ()=
√
, one would solve
max
(
−
 X
=1
 √
 −
√
−1
ln
µ
 √
 −
√
−1
¶)
,s . t .( 2 0 ) .
In the absence of the -constraints, the solution would be  =
√
 −
√
−1, i.e. ()=
√
, as desired.
20In contrast to the set-identiﬁed situation, the maximum entropy problem will either
have no solution (if the constraint set is empty, for instance) or a unique solution, which
would make it easy to report. This unique solution will have a meaningful interpretation
as the admissible utility function closest to a speciﬁc utility function (e.g., a risk-neutral
one). Moreover, when the ’s are estimated, one can, in principle, construct conﬁdence
intervals for both the solution and the value function for the above problems, using the
distribution theory for the estimated ’s.
5.2.3 Inference
Testing whether the existing allocation is eﬃcient for a given utility function, reduces
essentially to testing a set of (conditional) moment inequalities (c.f., (8) or (9) above).
There is an existing and expanding literature in econometrics, dealing with such tests.
For example, one can adopt the method of Andrews and Soares (2009) to conduct such
tests and calculate conﬁdence intervals for the diﬀerence in treatment thresholds between
demographic groups. This corresponds to inference on the true parameters, rather than
inference on the identiﬁed set.
Inferring utility parameters consistent with eﬃcient allocation is an estimation problem
where the parameters of interest are deﬁned via conditional moment inequalities. The test
of rationality thereof is analogous to speciﬁcation testing in GMM problems but now with
inequality constraints. For the parametric case or the nonparametric case with discrete
outcome and covariates, the utility parameters are ﬁnite-dimensional and we are interested
in inferring the entire feasible set of utility parameters. So inference can be conducted
using, e.g., CHT (2005). Tests of rationality again amount to checking emptiness of
conﬁdence sets, which can be done using Andrews and Soares.
Inference for the maximum entropy solution, to our knowledge, is nonstandard. Es-
sentially, the inference problem is to ﬁnd the distribution theory for the solution and value
21function for the problem
max
(
−
 X
=2
 ln()
)
,s . t .
 ≥ 0,  =2 ,
 X
=1
 =1 ,

 − −1
≥
+1
+1 − 
,  =2  − 1

0 £

−1ˆ (
0)
¤
≥ 0 for all 
0.( 2 1 )
The problem (21) is simply (20) with  replaced by its estimate.
We now outline a method of solving (21) via a penalty method and conduct inference
on the solution and value function thereof. To do this, focus on the case where  is also
discrete and rewrite the last set of inequalities in the previous display as
P
=1 ˆ  ≤ 0
for  =1 . Now consider the problem
min
{}
⎧
⎨
⎩
 X
=1
 ln()+
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
ˆ 
)!2⎫
⎬
⎭
,s . t .
 ≥ 0,  =2 − 1,
 X
=1
 =1 ,

 − −1
≥
+1
+1 − 
,  =2  − 1.( 2 2 )
This is a penalized version of (21), where the penalty term

 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
ˆ 
)!2
is positive whenever for one or more ,t h et e r m ( s )
P
=1 ˆ  are positive. Here  will
be a sequence of positive numbers increasing with , so that the penalty for constraint
violation is higher when the sample size is large. Note that (22) is an optimization problem
with convex objective function and linear constraints. So ﬁnding a solution is easy. The
remaining question is: how to choose the sequence  to gurantee desirable properties of
the resulting solution and value— in particular, consistency and a tractable asymptotic
distribution.
22Deﬁne
ˆ  ()=
⎧
⎨
⎩
 X
=1
 ln()+
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
ˆ 
)!2⎫
⎬
⎭
,
()=
 X
=1
 ln(),
 =
(
 :  ≥ 0,  =2 ,
P
=1  =1 ,

−−1 ≥
+1
+1−,  =2  − 1.
)
,
 =
(
 :
 X
=1
 ≤ 0,  =1 
)
.
We use the standard convention that  ln()=0if  =0 .
Proposition 2 (Consistency) Assume that
√
(ˆ  − ) Ã  (0Σ).C h o o s e such
that  =  (
√
) and  →∞as  →∞ .T h e n
 lim
→∞
½
argmin
∈
ˆ  ()
¾
=a r g m i n
∈∩
().
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1 (Consistency of value function) Under the same conditions, as the pre-
vious proposition,
 lim
→∞
½
ˆ 
µ
argmin
∈
ˆ  ()
¶¾
= 
µ
arg min
∈∩
()
¶

Proof. See appendix.
5.3 Continuous case
Inequalities: When  is continuously distributed with support [01], the condition (16)
reduces to
Z
()
½
1 (| =1 )− 0 (| =1 )
 [1 − 0| =1 = ]
¾
| {z }
=1(),s a y

≥
Z
()
½
1 (|0=0 )− 0 (|0=0 )
 [∆| =0 = 0]
¾
| {z }
0(0),s a y
.
23So the question is: does there exist a function () s.t.
(0) = 0, (1) = 1 (aﬃne normalization)

0 (·) ≥ 0 (monotonic)

00 (·) ≤ 0 (concave) Z
()1 () ≥
Z
()0 (
0) for all 
0.
Maximum Entropy: Deﬁne ()=0 () and
 (;
0) ≡
Z 
0
[1 () − 0 (
0)].
Then the constraints (16) reduce to
() ≥ 0,
Z 1
0
() =1
−
0 () ≥ 0 for all  ∈ [01]
−
Z
() (;
0) ≥ 0 for all 
0.( 2 3 )
The last inequality follows by applying integration by parts to
R
()[1 () − 0 (0)]
and recognizing that for any , it follows from deﬁnition of the  functions that
R 1
0 1 () =
0. The maximum entropy solution is then given by
max−
Z 1
0
()ln
µ
()
0 ()
¶
,s . t .( 2 3 ) ,
where 0 () corresponds to a reference utility function. For example, when 0 ()=1we
ﬁnd the most risk-neutral utility function satisfying the constraints whereas 0 ()=1 
corresponds to ﬁnding the utility function closest to the risk-averse sub-utility ()=
ln() which satisﬁes the constraints.
Inference: C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r e is continuous and recall the restrictions:
(0) = 0, (1) = 1 (aﬃne normalization)

0 (·) ≥ 0 (monotonic)

00 (·) ≤ 0 (concave) Z
()1 () ≥
Z
()0 (
0) for all 
0.
24Suppose  is discrete and takes values 1.L e t() ≡ 1 ()−0 ().D e ﬁne
the criterion function as
()=
X

X

µ
min
½
0
Z
()()
¾¶2
and its estimated analog (with (·) replaced by their estimates) as  ().A tt h i sp o i n t ,
it is necessary to approximate the functions (·) via a basis (a sieve) and imposing the
restrictions implied by the structure of utility functions and the eﬃciency requirement.
Typically, we would consider a sieve basis {1} and consider approximating
(·) by the sum
P
=1  (·) and choosing the coeﬃcients such that the monotonicity
and concavity are satisﬁed. One convenient choice of basis are cardinal B-splines (see,
Chen (2005)) for which monotonicity and concavity are equivalent to the coeﬃcients {},
 =1 2, satisfying simple linear inequalities— say, () ≥ 0, for an appropriate matrix
().T h e nt h ei d e n t i ﬁed set for (·) can be approximated by the identiﬁed set for the
-coeﬃcients. The latter can be obtained by using the criterion function
˜  ()=
X

X

Ã
min
(
0
Z (
 X
=1
 ()
)
()
)!2
and its estimated analog (with (·) replaced by their estimates) denoted by ˘  ().T h e
CI for the identiﬁed set of approximating ’s is then given by
ˆ  =
n
 : () ≥ 0; ˘  () ≤ 
o
,
for an appropriately chosen . A detailed analysis is left to future research.
The maximum entropy solution corresponding to the sample values of ˆ (0) will be
random simply because the are estimated. Finding the asymptotic distribution of the
resulting ˆ ’s would require us to ﬁrst decide on which constraints are (approximately)
binding. One approach is to ﬁrst calculate the sample solution for the ’s by solving the
optimization problem with the estimated value of ˆ (0). Then drop those constraints
for which the the constraint function evaluated at the sample estimates of the ’s exceeds
—a decreasing function of the sample size  (such as ln()
−12). These are the esti-
mated nonbinding constraints with zero Lagrange multipliers and these will not appear in
the ﬁnal solution. Then use the remaining constraints to solve the optimization problem
explicitly, resulting in a set of ﬁrst order equations involving (possibly nonlinearly) the
25’s, the Lagrange multipliers for the binding constraints and the ˆ ’s. Finding the asymp-
totic distribution of the resulting estimated ’s will simply be an application of the delta
method. The only nontrivial issue involves ﬁguring out how the ﬁrst stage decision on
which constraints are binding will impact the asymptotic distribution of the estimated
’ s .I ti sr e a s o n a b l et oe x p e c tt h a tw h e nt h eﬁrst-stage cut-oﬀ is chosen to be of higher
order than −12,t h eﬁrst stage decision has no impact on the asymptotic distribution,
i.e., it is as if we knew which constraints bind.
6 A simulation exercise
We report simulation results for the following linear regression model linking outcome 
with regressors   and the treatment indicator  as follows.
 =1 + 0 2 +  ×  +0 4 +0 5
 (∆ |)= ×  +0 5 × .
We generate (∗) from a bivariate normal with mean zero, correlation 05 and variances
(2
1).T h ec o e ﬃcient  is chosen to be positive. The variable  is a dummy for female
and is generated as the indicator for ∗  0. We generate 2 observations this way and
randomly divide them into an observational and an experimental group.
Within the experimental group, the binary treatment  was generated randomly.
Corresponding to a realization of (), the corresponding  was generated according
to the model.
In the observational group, the DM was assumed to calculate  ( | =1 )and
 ( | =0 )using the actual model coeﬃcients and then assign the males ( =0 )t o
treatment if the diﬀerence exceeds  =0and assign the females ( =1 )t ot r e a t m e n t
if the diﬀerence exceeds  =0 5. Given the model, this means that for both males
and females,  =1iﬀ 0.
In both the experimental and observational samples, the econometrician observes 
but not . Additionally, the econometrician observes a noisy signal of .T h i si sg i v e nb y
the variable  =1+1(  + 0) with ˜ (01). The DM’s rule implies the following
26expressions.
 (∆ | =1  =1 = )= ×  {|0 =1 = } +0 5,
 (∆ | =0  =1 = )= ×  {|0 =1 = } +0 5,
 (∆ | =1  =0 = )= ×  {|0 =0 = },
 (∆ | =0  =0 = )= ×  {|0 =0 = }.
T h et r u eb o u n d sa r et h e ng i v e nb y
max
∈{12}
 ×  {|0 =1 = } +0 5
≤ 
≤ min
∈{12}
 ×  {|0 =1 = } +0 5,
and
max
∈{12}
 ×  {|0 =0 = }
≤ 
≤ min
∈{12}
 ×  {|0 =0 = },
and these can be easily simulated.
T h ev a l u e so f,  and variance of  were varied in the experiment. A larger absolute
value of  indicates that observing  rather than  is less of a handicap and so this
should lead to narrower bounds on the thresholds. A larger 2
 implies wider support
for , which, ceteris paribus, will widen the bounds because it would lead to a larger
diﬀerence between the minimum (or maximum) over the support of  and the mean over
the distribution of . Bounds will be narrower when  is close to zero. The intuition
is that when  is close to zero, the omitted variable  plays a smaller role in treatment
assignment and not knowing  is less of a handicap for knowing  and .
For each sample size and each choice of , , 2
, we ran 100 replications of the
experiment. In each replication, we calculated sample-based bounds on  and 
and constructed conﬁdence intervals for the diﬀerence  −  , using the steps
outlined in section 3. We report two sets of bounds—one that is simply the sample analog
of the population inequalities and the other is a weighted average of bounds across values
of  w h e r ew e i g h te q u a l st h ei n v e r s eo ft h es q u a r e - r oo to f∗(1 − ) and  is the probability
27in the observational sample that  =1for that value of . The results are shown in
table 1.
Second, we calculated bounds on the risk aversion parameter corresponding to the
parametric case. Third, we calculated bounds on the (monotone and concave) utility
functions corresponding to the nonparametric case. One would expect the test to reject
rationality more often and the bounds to be narrower when the sample size is large.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Alternatives
Get DM’s decision on applications but randomize—cleanest
Randomized allocation followed by DM’s allocation— e.g. students into classes
TBA...
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8 Appendix: Proofs
Derivation of (1): The solution to the problem
max

½Z
1{ ∈ }1

1(1)+
Z
1{ ∈ 
}0

0(0)
¾
s.t. Z
1{ ∈ }1

1 (1)+
Z
1{ ∈ 
}0

0 (0) ≤ ,
is of the form ∗ = { :  ()  },w i t h
 () ≡
 (∆| = )
 (∆ | = )
;  =
Z
∈
1( ()  )

 ().
Proof. The welfare resulting from a generic choice of , satisfying the budget con-
29straint, diﬀe r sf r o mt h ew e l f a r ef r o mu s i n g∗ by an amount given by
() − (
∗)
=
Z
1{ ∈ }1

1(1)+
Z
1{ ∈ 
}0

0(0)
−
½Z
1{ ∈ 
∗}1

1(1)+
Z
1{ ∈ 
∗}0

0(0)
¾
=
Z "
1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ ∗}
−1{ ∈ ∗}×1{ ∈ }
#
1

1(1)
+
Z "
1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ ∗}
−1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ ∗}
#
0

0(0).
=
Z
1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ 
∗}×
∙Z
1

1|(1|) −
Z
0

0|(0|)
¸
 ()
−
Z
1{ ∈ 
}×1{ ∈ 
∗}×
∙Z
1

1|(1|) −
Z
0

0|(0|)
¸
 ().
Now, note that  ∈ ∗ implies that
(∆|=)
 ≥  (∆ | = ),a n d ∈ ∗
implies that
(∆|=)
 ≤  (∆ | = ). Consequently, the previous display
≤
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ 
∗} ()
−
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ 
}×1{ ∈ 
∗} ()
=
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ } ()
−
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ 
∗} ()
−
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ 
∗} ()
+
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ }×1{ ∈ 
∗} ()
=
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ } ()
−
1

Z

 (∆| = ) × 1{ ∈ 
∗} ()=


−


=0 .
T h el a s tb u to n es t e pf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tb o t h and ∗ must satisfy the budget
constraint. Since () ≤ (∗),a n d is any set satisfying the budget constraint, it
follows that ∗ must be the optimal one.
Proposition 1:
30Proof. (i) implies (ii). Notice that
−
 X
=1
()=
−1 X
=1
 (() − ()) =
−1 X
=1

−1 X
=
((+1) − ())
=
−1 X
=1
((+1) − ())
=
−1 X
=1
(+1) − ()
+1 − 
×  (+1 − )
=
−1 X
=1
Ã
−1 X
=+1
½
() − (−1)
 − −1
−
(+1) − ()
+1 − 
¾!
×  (+1 − )
+
() − (−1)
 − −1
−1 X
=1
 (+1 − )
=
−1 X
=2
½
() − (−1)
 − −1
−
(+1) − ()
+1 − 
¾
×
−1 X
=1
 (+1 − )
+
() − (−1)
 − −1
−1 X
=1
 (+1 − )
=
−1 X
=2
½
() − (−1)
 − −1
−
(+1) − ()
+1 − 
¾
×  +
() − (−1)
 − −1

By concavity of (·),w eh a v et h a t
() ≥
+1 − 
+1 − −1
(−1)+
 − −1
+1 − −1
(+1),
whence it follows that for every :
() − (−1)
 − −1

(+1) − ()
+1 − 
.
This plus  ≥ 0, for every  =1 − 1, implies that
P
=1 () ≤ 0 for every
concave and nondecreasing (·).
(ii) implies (i). Suppose   0 for some  ∈ {2 − 1}. We will show that there
exists a nondecreasing concave (·) such that −
P
=1 () ≤ 0.R e c a l lt h a t
−
 X
=1
()=
−1 X
=2
½
() − (−1)
 − −1
−
(+1) − ()
+1 − 
¾
× 
+
() − (−1)
 − −1

31Consider a utility function of the form
()=


× 1( ≤ )+1× 1( ≥ ).
It is obvious that this is a nondecreasing concave continuous function. Now, for this utility
function,
() − (−1)
 − −1
=0 ,
() − (−1)
 − −1
−
(+1) − ()
+1 − 
=
1

× 1( = ),
implying that −
P
=1 ()=  0.
Proposition 2: Assume that
√
(ˆ  − ) Ã  (0Σ).C h o o s e such that  =
 (
√
) and  →∞as  →∞ .T h e n
 lim
→∞
½
argmin
∈
ˆ  ()
¾
=a r g m i n
∈∩
().
Proof. Let
 ()=
⎧
⎨
⎩
 X
=1
 ln()+
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1

)!2⎫
⎬
⎭
,

() =a r g m i n
∈
ˆ  ().
If () is non-unique, we choose any of those values (c.f., Amemiya (1985), page 103)).
Fix 0 and assume that for at least one ,w eh a v e
P
=1 
()
  . Then,
ˆ  ()=
 X
=1

()
 ln
³

()

´
+ 
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
ˆ 
()

)!2
=
 X
=1

()
 ln
³

()

´
+ 
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
(ˆ  − )
()
 +
 X
=1

()

)!2
=
 X
=1

()
 ln
³

()

´
+
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 √

 X
=1
©√
(ˆ  − )
ª

()
 + 
 X
=1

()

)!2

 X
=1

()
 ln
³

()

´
+
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 √

 X
=1
©√
(ˆ  − )
ª

()
 + 
)!2
=
 X
=1

()
 ln
³

()

´
+ 
2

2 +  (1), by hypothesis.
32Thus, by choosing  (and thus ) large enough, ˆ 
¡
()¢
can be made arbitrarily large,
but for any  ∈ ∩, ˆ  ()=
P
=1  ln() remains ﬁnite. This contradicts that () =
argmin∈ ˆ  ().S i n c e is arbitrary, it must be that Pr
¡
() ∈ 
¢
→ 1. Therefore, for
any 0,
Pr
µ° ° ° °arg min
∈∩
ˆ  () − argmin
∈
ˆ  ()
° ° ° ° 
¶
≤ Pr
¡

()  ∈ 
¢
→ 0,
implying ° ° ° °arg min
∈∩
ˆ  () − argmin
∈
ˆ  ()
° ° ° ° =  (1).( 2 4 )
Next, note that for any two real numbers :
|max{0} − max{0}| ≤ | − |.( 2 5 )
Therefore,
¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  () −  ()
¯ ¯ ¯
= 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
ˆ 
)!2
−
 X
=1
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1

)!2¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤ 
 X
=1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1
ˆ 
)!2
−
Ã
max
(
0
 X
=1

)!2¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= 
 X
=1
⎧
⎨
⎩
¯ ¯ ¯
³
max
n
0
P
=1 ˆ 
o´
−
³
max
n
0
P
=1 
o´¯ ¯ ¯
×
¯ ¯ ¯
³
max
n
0
P
=1 ˆ 
o´
+
³
max
n
0
P
=1 
o´¯ ¯ ¯
⎫
⎬
⎭
≤ 
 X
=1
⎧
⎨
⎩
¯ ¯ ¯
³
max
n
0
P
=1 ˆ 
o´
−
³
max
n
0
P
=1 
o´¯ ¯ ¯
×
n¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 ˆ 
¯ ¯ ¯ +
¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 
¯ ¯ ¯
o
⎫
⎬
⎭
≤ 
 X
=1
⎧
⎨
⎩
¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 (ˆ  − )
¯ ¯ ¯
×
n¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 ˆ 
¯ ¯ ¯ +
¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 
¯ ¯ ¯
o
⎫
⎬
⎭
,b y( 2 5 )
=
 √

 X
=1
⎧
⎨
⎩
¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1
√
(ˆ  − )
¯ ¯ ¯
×
n¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 ˆ 
¯ ¯ ¯ +
¯ ¯ ¯
P
=1 
¯ ¯ ¯
o
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
By hypothesis and the fact that ∩ is a compact set, we get that sup∈∩
¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  () −  ()
¯ ¯ ¯ =
 (1). But because  ()=() for  ∈  ∩ , it follows that
sup
∈∩
¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  () − ()
¯ ¯ ¯ =  (1).
33Note also that  ∩  is compact and ˆ  () is continuous in . Finally, since  ∩  is
compact and () is strictly convex in , it follows that argmin∈∩ () is unique.
Thus all the conditions for consistency of M-estimators (e.g., Amemiya (1985), theorem
4.1.1) are satisﬁed, and it follows that
 lim
→∞
½
arg min
∈∩
ˆ  ()
¾
=a r g m i n
∈∩
().
The ﬁnal result follows from the previous display and (24).
Corollary (Consistency of value function): Under the same conditions, as the
previous proposition,
 lim
→∞
½
ˆ 
µ
argmin
∈
ˆ  ()
¶¾
= 
µ
arg min
∈∩
()
¶

Proof. Let ∗ =a r gm i n ∈∩ (). By triangle inequality,
Pr
n¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  (
) − (
∗)
¯ ¯ ¯ 
o
 Pr
³¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  (
) − 
¡

()¢¯ ¯ ¯   2
´
+P r( |(
) − (
∗)|   2)
=P r
³¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  (
) − 
¡

()¢¯ ¯ ¯   2
´
+ (1), by continuous mapping theorem
=P r
³¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  (
) − 
¡

()¢¯ ¯ ¯   2
 ∈ 
´
+ (1),s i n c ePr(
  ∈ ) → 0
≤ Pr
µ
sup
∈∩
¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ  () − ()
¯ ¯ ¯   2
¶
+ (1)
= (1), by uniform convergence on  ∩ .
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